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During the final days of President Clinton's impeachment hearings,' a senior
White House attorney, Charles Ruff, was asked whether the President intended to
grant a pardon to himself for any criminal wrongdoing Ruff answered that the
President would "absolutely" not grant himself a pardon nor accept a pardon from
his successor Nonetheless, this question raises a provocative constitutional
2. The House Judiciary Committee held hearings and recommended to the full House of
Representatives the impeachment of the President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton.
Clinton was impeached on two of the four articles approved by the House Judiciary Committee on
December 19, 1998, regarding the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Two articles of impeachment were
approved: Article I and Article 3. Article I stated that President Clinton lied and provided misleading
testimony to an August 17, 1998, federal grand jury concerning his relationship with White House intern
Monica Lewinsky. Article I was approved by a vote of 228-206. Article 3 stated that President Clinton
obstructed justice by encouraging Monica Lewinsky to lie about their relationship when she provided
testimony for the Paula Jones civil suit, and the President assisted in finding a job for Lewinsky to buy
influence for her positive testimony. The article also stated that Clinton allowed his attorney, Robert
Bennett, to make false statements to a federal judge regarding the President's relationship with Lewinsky.
Article 2, charging perjury in a civil deposition and Article 4, charging abuse of power, were rejected
by the House. See H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (Dec. 19, 1998) (enacted) (official Articles of
Impeachment against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States). See generally Bob
Deans, Clinton Impeached; President Vows Not To Quit; Bid for Censure Moves To Senate, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Dec. 20, 1998, at Al; see also, e.g., David Jackson, Clinton Impeached President Urges
Compromise in the Senate to Avoid a Trial House OKs 2 Articles in Bitter Partisan Vote, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS. Dec. 20, 1998, at IA; Frank Murray, Impeached; Clinton "Indelibly Stained" in a
Decisive Vote; 2 out of 4 Articles Approved by House, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at Al; Roger
Simon, House Impeaches President Clinton; He Vows To Serve "Until the Last Hour of the Last Day
of My Term"; "We Must Stop Politics of Personal Destruction," A Calm President Says, CHI. TRIB., at
1. The Constitution provides that after impeachment, the U.S. Senate shall conduct a trial to determine
whether the President should be convicted and removed from office. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6,
7 (describing the impeachment requirements). Conviction requires a two-thirds vote of the members
present. See id. The United States Senate acquitted Clinton on all charges. On the perjury count, the
Senate voted 45 guilty and 55 not guilty. On the obstruction of justice charge, the Senate split 50 votes
not guilty and 50 voter guilty, not reaching the two-thirds vote required. See 145 CONG. REc. S 1457-02
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (trial of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States). The
Constitution requires the Chief Justice of the United States to preside over the trial. See U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 3, cl. 6. At the conclusion of the trial, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who had presided over
the impeachment trial, stated:
The Senate having tried William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, upon
two articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, and
two-thirds of the Senators present not having found him guilty of the charges contained
therein: it is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the said William Jefferson Clinton be,
and he is hereby, acquitted of the charges in this said article.
145 CONG. REC. S1457-02. Two hours after the vote of acquittal, President Clinton said he was
"profoundly sorry" for the events that lead to his impeachment, and that "this can and must be a time
of reconciliation and rrnewal for America." Peter Baker, Clinton Acquitted, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999,
at A01; Richard A. Serrano, Clinton Acquitted; Votes Fall Far Short of Conviction; Perjury Charge
Rejected 5445, LA. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at Al.
3. See House Conmittee on Judiciary Holds Hearing an Impeachment of President Clinton - The
President's Lawyers Present Their Case, Day 2 - Panel I - Prosecution Standard for Obstruction of
Justice and Perjury, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1998 WL 849446 (Dec. 9, 1998)
[hereinafter Judiciary Hearing - President's Lawyers Present Their Case] (verbatim transcript).
4. See id. The e:change between U.S. Rep. Steve Chabot (R.-Ohio) and White House Lawyer
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question: can the President pardon himself for criminal acts committed while or
before holding office? Article II of the Constitution prohibits a President from using
the pardon power to overturn an impeachment5 The Framers of the Constitution
placed only this limitation on the ability of the President to exercise his pardon
power,' and the only sanction for the abuse of the pardon power is the removal of
the President through impeachment.7 The Constitution is silent, however, as to
whether the President may grant himself a pardon from prosecution and, if so, when
such a pardon may be issued! In the over 20,000 instances that Presidents have
used this exclusive power,9 no President has used this power to pardon himself.'
One viewpoint is that a presidential self-pardon is inherently inconsistent with
"natural law," which proclaims that one may not judge oneself." Some scholars
Charles Ruff follows:
Chabot: You stated in the preface to your written submission that you made to this
committee that nothing the President has done justifies criminal conduct. Correct?
Ruff: That's corrcL
Chabot: In that case, I assume there's no reason for the President to grant himself a
pardon before he would leave office for any criminal acts that he might have committed.
Can you assure us that President Clinton will not pardon himself or that he will not accept
a pardon from any presidential successor?
Ruff: Absolutely.
Chabot: Okay. Thank you.
Id.
5. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating powers of the presidency include "Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment"); Exparte Garland,
71 U.S. (4, Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (holding "the power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception
stated").
6. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2 (granting the President the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment").
7. See id. In 1788, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, except those
of impeachment. The governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of
impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of the Governor, in this
article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the President.
THE FEDERALTST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mar. 14, 1788). Eleven days later, Hamilton wrote that
"[h]umanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as
little as possible fettered or embarrassed." THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mar. 25,
1788).
8. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2; see also Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380 (holding the pardon
power "may be exercised at any time after its [offense] commission, either before legal proceedings are
taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgement"). In cases where the President serves
his entire term, suggests New York University law professor Stephen Gillers, the timing of a presidential
self-pardon would likely occur during the President's lame-duck period after the election proceeding his
retirement from office. See Stephen Gillers, Is It Principle, or Is It Pragmatism?, STAR TRIB., Aug. 4,
1998, at I IA.
9. See Harvey Berkman, Will the President Pardon His Friends?, NAY' L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at Al;
Jonathan Kerr, Presidential Pardons Have Long and Sometimes Unforgiving History, WEST LEGAL NEWS
12366, Nov. 20, 1996, at *1, available in 1996 WL 667229.
10. See Daniel Schorr, Editorial, Will Bush Pardon Himself?., BALT. SUN., Dec. 30, 1992, at 13A
(stating absence of any presidential self-pardons). In fact, the only President to ever receive a pardon was
President Nixon for his involvement in the Watergate scandal that lead to his resignation. See id.
11. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (holding in Justice Chase's opinion that the
1999]
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argue that the Constitution explicitly provides that an impeached President is subject
to normal criminal charges after leaving office, and because a presidential self-
pardon would prevent prosecution, its use would be antithetical to this constitutional
mandate."2 Others, including lawmakers, have recognized the inherent problem in
the text of the Constitution, which can be construed to allow a President to pardon
his own criminal activities prior to, or after indictment, trial, or conviction." In a
House Judiciary Committee exchange with former Massachusetts Governor William
Weld, Virginia Republican Bob Goodlatte stated that "the President of the United
States has the power to pardon, and the prevailing opinion is the President can
pardon himself."'"
While commentators may disagree as to the ability of the President to pardon
himself,'" this Article will prove, through a textual and historical analysis, that the
Constitution has inherent natural laws or first principles); see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITTIONAL
LAW 433-35 (12th el. 1991); CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMAcY 38-40 (1973).
12. See Clinton: WelL Paaardon Me?, NEWswEEK, Dec. 14, 1998, at 14 (citing Professor Stephen
Saltzburg of George Washington University, who argues that self-pardons would prevent the President
from being subject to traditional criminal charges after his presidency, which goes against the explicit
wishes of the Constitution); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("Judgements in Case of Impeachment
shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.").
13. See Judiciary Hearing - President's Lawyers Present Their Case, supra note 3.
14. Id. The exchange between U.S. Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R.-Va.) and former Massachusetts Gov.
William Weld follows:
Goodlatte: The President of the United States has the power to pardon, and the
prevailing opinion is the President can pardon himself. Are we all in agreement that the
likelihood of a-iy kind of subsequent prosecution of this case, regardless of your opinion
of the merits, is not going to take place because of the reality of the circumstance that
either for practical reasons after the President leaves office or because he could bestow
a pardon upon himself, that that would take place?
Weld: I car't image the President pardoning himself, Mr. Congressman. When I said
that I thought the post-term risk was low, that's because of my assessments of the merits
of the prosecution case.
Goodlatte: But nonetheless, he has that power, and the Constitution is very explicit
about the one exception to the use of that power, and that is the circumstances where the
President is impeached. He cannot then pardon himself, and restore himself to office as
a result of impeachment, obviously.
Id.
15. Compare Akhil Reed Amar, Now Playing... A Constitutional Nightmare, WASH. POST, Sept.
20, 1998, at COI (the President "cannot constitutionally pardon himself' to control an investigation),
Stephen B. Presser, Commentary, The Legal Limits, Cm. TRtB., Nov. 17, 1996, at 21 (arguing the use
of a self-pardon would be unconstitutional due to the structure of the Constitution), and Clinton: Well,
Paaardon Me?, supra note 12, at 14 (citing Professor Stephen Saltzburg, who states that self-pardons
would prevent the Pre, ident from being subject to traditional criminal charges after his presidency, which
goes against the explicit wishes of the Constitution), with Bill Bush, Clinton Has Power to Pardon
Himself, OSU Professors Say, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 1998, at 3A (citing Ohio State University
law professors who support the notion of self-pardoning power inherent in the Constitution), Tom
Campbell, Editorial, Why I Have Decided to Vote to Impeach the President, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 1998,
at A27 (Rep. Campbell (R.-Ca.)) (noting "[flurthermore, the Constitution does not prohibit the President
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Constitution as it currently stands, permits a presidential self-pardon. A
constitutional amendment is needed to prevent any President from pardoning
himself, and such an amendment should also limit the President's ability to pardon
members of his immediate family. This article will overview the history that
developed into the modem pardon power. This article will further analyze the legal
authority for a self-pardon, concluding with a proposal to amend the Constitution
so as to prevent a presidential self-pardon. Part I1 of this Article provides a history
of the pardon power, including how the power arrived in the United States and how
United States Presidents have used it. Part I discusses two Presidents, Richard
Nixon and George Bush, whose administrations contemplated the self-pardon option.
Part IV advocates that the current constitutional make-up allows for a presidential
self-pardon. Part V of this article proposes a constitutional amendment that would
limit the President's pardon power. Finally, Part VI offers a conclusion on the self-
pardon power of the President.
II. Pardon Power History
A. Pre-American Pardon Power History
1. Ancient Athens and Rome
To understand the historical roots of the American pardon power, it is essential
to review the historical tradition of pardons in ancient Athens and Rome. In ancient
Athens, the notion of granting clemency or a pardon had not fully developed,
primarily due to the nature of a pure democracy that was the foundation of the
governmental structure.'6 There was, however, a process to allow for clemency."7
from pardoning himself - leaving impeachment as the only sanction from which the President could
not escape by his own action"), Peter Ferrara, Commentary, Could President Pardon Himself?, WASH.
TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1996, at A14 (arguing a constitutional amendment is required to prevent a President from
pardoning himself), Joseph T. Hallinan, The Prosecution Starr Has One Last Option: To Indict Clinton
on Criminal Charges Series: Clinton - Investigating the President, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 23, 1998, at
14 (quoting, in discussing Clinton's options if indicted, George Washington University Law Professor
Paul Butler as stating that "he could always pardon himself"), and Mark Levin & Arthur Fergezison,
Editorial, Can You Indict a Sitting President?, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1998, at A17 (arguing a sitting
President could not removed from office by indictment due fact that "[hie also has the power to grant
himself an unconditional and complete pardon and thereby bar the prosecution"). On the other hand,
some scholars have not reached a conclusion on whether the President may pardon himself. See Thomas
Hargrove, Few Rules Govern Pardon Authority, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 12, 1998, at A25 (quoting
University of Southern California Law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as stating, "Of course, we don't
know if a president can pardon himself. No one has ever tried that."); Ronald Rotunda, The True
Significance of Clinton vs. Jones, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 1997, at 13 ("Could the President avoid the whole
problem by giving himself a pardon? Who knows?") (law professor at the University of Illinois). To
date, only one other law review article directly titles this topic and concludes for primarily structural
reasons that a self-pardon is not permissible. See Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional
Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779 (1996). This article substantially differs from
Kalt's view, as it does not dispute the President's current legal ability to pardon himself. Even Kalt's
article acknowledges that the Framers may have relied on the political process to control self-pardoning,
through impeachment and election, and not any direct restriction on self-pardoning. Id. at 788.
16. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power Front the
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
By 403 B.C.E., a process known as Adeia allowed a democratic pardon for a person
who, by secret ballot, received 6000 citizens' approval." Due to the difficulty of
obtaining such a large number of supporters, however, the possibility of receiving
a pardon through Adeia was generally reserved for athletes, orators, and other
powerful figures."j Therefore, the process was distinct from a pardon as an
executive privilege, and more analogous to a popularity contest."
Similarly, the ancient Romans employed a system of clemency; however, it was
one in which mercy or justice was not the primary motive - politics was the
driving force, including one infamous example of Pontius Pilate's historical pardon
of Barabbas rather than Jesus." The Romans used the pardon power to control
masses of Roman citizens and soldiers. In a crude example of the use of clemency,
the ancient Romans chose to execute every tenth mutinous troop instead of
executing the entire army of transgressors,' thereby using the pardon power as a
measure of discipline and fear for the remaining soldiers.' Even more intriguing
was the Roman use of pardons for those condemned persons who accidentally
encountered a vestal virgin on the way to the execution location.' The lessons
learned in Athens and Rome set the framework for the development in England for
monarchial pardon powers.'
King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 583-84 (1991) (arguing pardons were not fully developed until a monarchy,
because of the very nature of the Athenian democracy, which was based on a governmental structure of
decision making by the populace). Athens placed certain limitations on pardons, basically limiting their
scope to public crimes, including treason. See id. at 583 n.77.
17. See id. at 583-84. Athens provided for a process of individual pardons - known as the Adeia
process - and grants of broad amnesty. See id at 584 n.80 (citing ARISTOTLE, CONSTITUTION OF
ATHENS ch. 39 (K. Von Fritz & E. Kapp trans., 2d prtg. 1961)).
18. See idL at 583 (citing DOUGLAS MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 258-59 (1978)).
The process required a popular collection of 6000 votes to support a pardon from a particular public
violation. See id.
19. See 3 U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES
9 (1939), cited in Kobil, supra note 16, at 583 n.79 (stating only a few pardons were actually granted,
including Alcibiades in 408 B.C.E., the pardon of Demosthenes in 323 B.C.E., and other notable athletes
and orators).
20. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 583-84 (demonstrating the popular nature of Athenian pardons,
including the special treatment of celebrities).
21. See id. at 584-85; see also John 18:38-40 (King James) ("Pilate saith unto him, 'What is truth?'
And when he had said this, he went out again unto the Jews, and saith unto them, 'I find in him no fault
at all. But ye have a c~istom, that I should release unto you one at the passover will ye therefore that
I release unto you the King of the Jews?'").
22. See KATHLEE', 0. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15-17
(1989). Pardons from execution were often issued around significant holidays and coronation
celebrations, which allowed the government to show good will to the common people, thus building
loyalty of their command. See id. at 17.
23. See id.
24. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 585 (citing PLUTARCH, NumA POMPILIUS, in THE LIVES OF THE
NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 74, 83 (J. Dryden trans., A. Clough rev., Modern Library ed. n.d.)).
25. See id.
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2. The Pardon Power Under the English Monarch
William Blackstone recognized the roots of the pardon power in England derived
from the Roman tradition.' The purpose of the pardon in a system of social order,
as Blackstone describes, was for the Crown to show mercy towards its subjects."
He noted that the use of pardons was to "endear the sovereign to his subjects, and
contribute more than anything to root in their hearts that filial affection and personal
loyalty which are the sure establishment of a prince."' In 1535, Henry VIII gained
absolute pardon power? In 1536, Parliament passed an action that provided the
King the absolute authority to pardon or remit crimes such as treason, murders, and
felonies.?
While self-pardons are not specifically mentioned in English law, the King - by
definition - could not commit a crime against the Crown, because one cannot
commit a crime against oneself.3?' The only remedy Parliament retained for an
abuse of the pardon power was to remove the King from office,32 just as the
United States Congress similarly has only the impeachment power as a remedy
against abuse of presidential pardons.
The King's pardon power was later limited to exclude pardoning of those
impeached,33 which is the only limitation on the pardon power listed in the United
States Constitution.' Because Henry VIII secured complete pardon power in 1535,
full authority was vested in the Crown until political crises overtook London
regarding the King's dissention with the will of Parliament.35 The result, the Act
of Settlement of 1700, removed from the Crown the power to pardon a person
26. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *388 (commenting on Roman traditions being
used as examples for English pardon powers).
27. See id. at *398 (describing mercy as not only an act of good will, but one to instill loyalty of
the subjects for the greatness of the crown).
28. ld.
29. See id. By the time of Henry VIII's command of England, the law vested the King with
exclusive and absolute power to pardon those accused of crimes. Lord Chief Justice Coke characterized
the King as a leader with great discretion and authority in exercising the power, and the power could be
.either absolute, or under condition, exception, or qualification. .. ." SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD
PART OF THE INsTrMruTs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 233 (1817), cited in Kobil, supra note 16, at 584-
85.
30. Kobil, supra note 16, at 586 n.95 (citing AN AcrE RECONTYNUYNG OF CTAYNE LwmEs AND
FRANCHESES HERETOFORE TAKEN FROME THE CROWNE, 1535-36, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 24, § I) (describing
Parliament's granting the King "the [w]hole and sole power and auctoritie [authority]" to pardon).
31. See JOSEPH CHrrTY, A TREA71SE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN AND THE
RELATIVE DUTnEs AND RIGirTs OF THE SUBJEcr 5 (1820) ("[T]he law suppose[d] it impossible that the
King himself [could] act unlawfully or improperly."), cited in James N. Jorgensen, Note, Federal
Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
345, 350 n.41 (1993).
32. See id.
33. See Ashley M. Steiner, Remission of Guilt or Removal of Punishment? The Effects of a
Presidential Pardon, 46 EMORY LJ. 959, 963-65 (1997).
34. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
35. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 587 (stating the crisis was precipitated by the King Charles I's
circumvention of Parliament's desire to prepare for war with France).
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during an ongoing impeachment hearing. This act was in response to the
impeachment of the Treasurer of England, the Earl of Danby Thomas Osborne,
whom King Charles II had pardoned.' Osborne was alleged to have followed
Charles I's order to extend a neutrality offer to France in exchange for substantial
payment. 8 This was in direct contradiction to Parliament's desire to raise funds for
a war against France. 9 Parliament took this action as an affront to its authority to
conduct foreign policy and, to make an example of Osborne, began impeachment
hearings.4 The King, in the midst of the inquiry, exercised his pardon authority
to relieve Osborne of any responsibility, thereby creating the crisis that eventually
limited the King's power to pardon for impeachment.4! ' This incident is also one
of the factors that led Parliament to limit the monarchy's power in favor of a more
democratic form of government. In fact, the compromise between the King and
Parliament resulted in the withdrawal of Osborne's impeachment, and the imposition
of a sentence of five years in the Tower of London.4
When Britain colonized North America, the King delegated his pardon power to
local royal colonial governors.43 The King also granted limited pardons to
transgressors in England who agreed to come to the Americas to work for low
wagesM This power continued until the signing of the Declaration of Independence
and the American Revolution.'
After the Revolution, but before the formation of the American Constitution, the
pardon power was usually shared in the various states between the state legislature
and the governor, or it was vested in the legislature alone. This was primarily
36. See William Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 475, 496 (1977) (quoting the Act of Settlement of 1700, which states "no pardon under
the great seal of England [shall] be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons in Parliament").
Parliament also passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which limited the King's ability to pardon in
cases where a person was accused of causing others to be imprisoned outside of the King's jurisdiction.
See Kobil, supra note 16, at 587-88 (citing Habeas Corpus Act (1679), 31 Car. 2 ch. 2, § 11 (Eng.)).
Parliament also passed the Bill of Rights, W. & M., ch. 2, § 2 (1689), which indirectly limited the King's
power by forbidding the King to disregard a law. See generally Jorgensen, supra note 31, at 351-52.
37. See Duker, supra note 36, at 487-95. The pardon of Thomas Osborne was a direct insult to
Parliament who viewed the situation as an attack on their sovereign power, and the King, protecting his
political messengers, moved members of Parliament to alter the power. See id.; see also Jorgensen, supra
note 31, at 350-52.
38. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 587; see also Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon
in England, 7 AM. J. LUGAL HisT., 51, 91-94 (1963).
39. See Kobil, sup,'a note 16, at 587.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id&
43. See Steiner, supra note 33, at 964 (noting the power of the King to delegate his power to local
colonial governors to grant pardons in the colonies for any offense allotted to this King, which was
unbridled discretion, except in cases of impeachment).
44. See Leslie Setba, Clemency in Perspective, in CRIMINOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ISRAEL DRAKIN 221, 224-28 (Simba F. Landau & Leslie Sebba eds., 1977), cited in Kobil,
supra note 16, at 588-89.
45. See Kobil, supi-a note 16, at 587-90.
46. See id.
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attributable to the general distrust of a single executive power - an attitude which
slowly changed after the formation of the Federal Republic.47
B. United States Constitutional Pardon History
1. The Development of the Pardon Power in the Constitution
This section demonstrates that the Framers failed to include a restriction on self-
pardons and vested the President with the exclusive right to pardon anyone, with the
exception of overturning an impeachment. With minor debate in the 1787
Constitutional Convention, the pardon power was included in the United States
Constitution.4 Much of the limited discussion at the Convention addressed which
body of government should possess the pardon power and what limitations should
be placed on the power' Some advocates, including Roger Sherman, proposed a
plan that placed the pardon power with the Senate. This plan failed, however,
because some felt the Senate would become too powerful among the separate
branches of government." One factor considered by the delegates was the pardon
power as it was used in the colonies, which placed the pardon power in a variety
of models, including in the legislature, the executive, or a combination of the two.5'
With little further discussion, the power was assigned to the executive branch, and
the discussion then turned to what limitations would be placed in the provision.'
The Framers looked to New York and other colonies to determine what restric-
tions should be placed on the President's ability to pardon 3 The Framers placed
only one restriction on the pardon power, that of not using a pardon to overturn an
impeachment.' It can be argued that the lack of any other enumerated restriction
was intentional.
47. See id.
48. See Duker, supra note 36, at 501. The pardon power was not included in the New Jersey or
Virginia plans presented at the convention. It was only brought forward at the advocacy of Alexander
Hamilton, Charles Pinckney, and John Rutledge, who proscribed some form of ultimate provisions to
allow for mercy. See id. In fact, only a few discussions were reported from the Convention. See Kobil,
supra note 16, at 590. For a general discussion of the pardon powers history in the United States and
current developments, see RONALD ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE 600-03 (2nd ed. 1992).
49. See Steiner, supra note 33, at 965-66.
50. See 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD
AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 380 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845), cited in Duker, supra note 36, at 501.
5 1. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 589-90 (citing governments in Virginia, Massachusetts Bay, Maine,
Maryland, the Carolinas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia placed the power in the executive
branch); see also Second Charter of Virginia (1609); Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629); Royal Grant
of the Province of Maine (1639); Charter of Maryland (1632); Charter of Carolina (1665); Grant to Duke
of York (1676) (chartering New Jersey); Chaster for the Province of Pennsylvania (1681); Charter of
Georgia (1732). The governments of Connecticut and Rhode Island placed the power in the legislature,
but only with the governor and sig assistant governors being present. See Charter of Connecticut (1662);
Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663).
52. See Steiner, supra note 33, at 965-66.
53. See i.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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One argument that is particularly relevant and supports the proposition that self-
pardoning was not excluded from the Framers' intent is that of Edmund Randolph,
who argued that the power to pardon for treason should not be allotted to the
President, since "[tihe President may himself be guilty."5 Randolph argued that
pardons should not be available to protect oneself.' This notion, however, was
affirmatively rejected at the urging of James Wilson for a strong pardon power with
almost no limitations.'
While not addressing self-pardons directly, there is a clear indication that pardons
were available to protect one's cohorts in a treason attempt.58 Wilson further argued
that if the President committed treason, he could be impeached and even prosecuted
after impeachment.5 The language that was ultimately placed in the Constitution
prohibited only the pardoning of an impeachment, and did not deal directly with
prosecution.'
Some commentators argue that other provisions included by .the Framers cover
this conflict, including a provision in the Constitution which explicitly provides that
a former President is subject to criminal charges after leaving office.6' It could be
argued, therefore, that a self-pardon would nullify the provisions of the Constitution
that allow for post-presidential prosecution. The pardon power, however, received
its most heated debate on the ability of the President to grant pardons for treason
of others.' Following the Constitutional Convention, Alexander Hamilton argued
that the pardon power would be necessary to assure justice, and the power should
resemble that power retained by the King of England.' The adoption of this
exclusive power was later the justification by the Supreme Court for prohibiting
Congress from interfering with the discretion of the President to issue pardons.'
55. 2 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHIcH FRAMED THE
CONSITTnON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 571 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds.,
1987) (1787), quoted in Steiner, supra note 33, at 965.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id
59. See id
60. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
61. See, e.g., Clinton: Well, Paaardon Me?, supra note 12, at 14; see aLvo U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 3
("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or profit under the United States: but the
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgement and Punishment,
according to Law.").
62. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 590-92; PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSITUTON OF THE UNITED STATES
350, 351-52 (Paul L. Fod ed., 1968) (quoting James Iredell, North Carolina delegate at the ratifying
convention, stating that "the probability of the President of the United States committing an act of treason
against his country is veiy slight").
63. See THE FEDER.UST Nos. 69, 74 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Jorgensen, supra note 31, at
353 ("The relative paucity of debate at the federal Constitutional Convention concerning inclusion of the
pardoning power in the Constitution suggests that the delegates intended presidential clemency powers
to mirror those of the English Crown.").
64. See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (reaffirming the exclusive pardon power of
the President, including the power to grant conditional pardons); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
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Alexander Hamilton argued that pardons were necessary so that "justice would [not]
wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel."'  James Iredell, a forceful
proponent of the strong executive pardon, argued as a delegate at the North Carolina
Federal Constitution ratifying convention that the pardon power was needed in
government and it should be placed with the body "possessing the highest
confidence of the people" - the executive branch. Hamilton further argued that
"one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of the government,
than a body of men."' Hamilton's view prevailed and the notion of limitations on
the President's pardon power was flatly rejected.
Without substantial debate, the pardon power was adopted with the same powers
afforded the King of England.' The pardon power was tested soon after
ratification, when our first President promptly utilized this exclusive power.2
2. Pardons from the Constitutional Convention to Secession
George Washington was the first American President to use the exclusive pardon
power, and among his first pardons were those issued to leaders of the Whiskey
Rebellion." In 1795, the leaders of the Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion were
accused of tarring and feathering officials attempting to collect a new federal tax of
sixty cents per gallon on whiskey.' In referring to one of the leaders as being "a
Wall.) 128, 141-42 (1871) (holding the President's pardon power is not subject to the control of
Congress); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (declaring the pardon power conferred
on the President by the Constitution is "unlimited," except for the impeachment exception, and the power
is "not subject to legislative control"); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 315 (1855) (noting the
pardon power is conferred under the Constitution, and the President may grant full pardons or conditional
pardons); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160-61 (1833) (describing a pardon as a "private
act, though official, act of the executive magistrate").
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
66. Address By James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), reprinted in
4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 17, 18 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
68. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Jorgensen, supra note 31, at 353.
69. See Jorgensen, supra note 31, at 353 (noting the brevity in the arguments on the pardon power
formation in the Constitution, including the little discussion of limitations on the power).
70. See Presidential Proclamation (July 10, 1795), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1895, at 181 (James Richardson ed., 1896) [hereinafter PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS], cited in Kobil, supra note 16, at 592. In the proclamation, President Washington
granted pardons for those involved in the Whiskey Rebellion tax revolt case.
71. See Berkman, supra note 9, at Al (describing the history of the pardon power, including
Washington's pardon of those involved in the Whiskey Rebellion).
72. In discussing the Whiskey Rebellion pardons, President Washington stated that
[flor though I shall always think it a sacred duty to exercise with firmness and energy the
constitutional powers with which I am vested, yet it appears to me no less consistent with
the public good than it is with my own feelings to mingle in the operations of
Government every degree of moderation and tenderness which the national justice and
safety may permit.
MOORE, supra note 22, at 27 (citing U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BD., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
(1975)); see Berkman, supra note 9, at Al (describing the history of the pardon power, including
Washington's pardon of those involved in the Whiskey Rebellion).
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little short of an idiot," Washington noted that the government should show
mercy.' In a less notable case, President John Adams used the pardon power to
excuse those involvd in a Pennsylvania insurrection. '
In a controversial act, President Thomas Jefferson next used the pardon power to
excuse alleged acts of treason under the Alien and Sedition Act.7s The pardons
released a number of Jeffersonian Republicans, whom the Federalists had convicted
when they published anti-Federalist political materials, which Jefferson believed
were protected by the First Amendment. 6 Some scholars, however, suggest that
Jefferson's motivation was not law or mercy, but rather freeing his political allies."
Jefferson also used the pardon power as an immunity tool to gain accomplice
testimony in the treason trial of Aaron Burr; however, the plan failed when the
individuals refused to accept the pardons.78 The pardon power went largely
unchallenged at a time when the Supreme Court was without a true understanding
of its own role until the nation's fourth Chief Justice, John Marshall, defined the
Court's role as the interpreter of the Constitution in 1803.'
The Supreme Court first reviewed the use of the pardon power during the
Andrew Jackson presidency in 1833, in a mail theft case.' Upholding the
presidential pardon, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that a pardon is "an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts
the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed."'" In another case, the Court later ruled that the pardon
power inherently allowed a President to issue clemency of a lesser nature, including
73. JOSEPH KALLNEACH, THE AMERICAN CHIEF ExacUTnvE 452-53 (1966) (discussing President
Washington's pardons of those involved in the Whiskey Rebellion, including one leader he learned was
"a little short of an idiot").
74. See Presidential Proclamation (May 21, 1800), reprinted in I PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra
note 70, at 303-04, cited in Kobil, supra note 16, at 592.
75. See Christoph-.r N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal
Perogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 895 (1994) (these political pardons where issued to excuse
supporters of Jefferson, which demonstrated a use of the power for political purposes); see also JAMES
M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FrElmtS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 268-
69 & n.67, 358 n.84 (1955).
76. See LETTER Fror, THOMAS JEFFERSON TO ABIOAL ADAMS (July 22, 1804), reprinted in II THE
WRITNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 43-44 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905). cited in May, supra note 75,
at 895; SMITH, supra note 76, at 268-69 & n.67, 358 n.84.
77. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 593 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, JEI"FERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
163 (1963) (suggesting Jefferson's personal political motivation in issuing the pardons)).
78. See ia. Jefferson used the pardon power in effect as a grant of immunity to initiate the testimony
of alleged accomplices, but the plan ultimately failed, as the parties failed to accept the pardons. See id.
79. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally GUNTHER, supra note
11, at 1-20; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIONAL LAW 203-08 (2nd ed. 1988); HAINES,
supra note 11, at 193-203.
80. See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833); Kobil, supra note 16, at 594.
81. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 160; Kobil, supra note 16, at 594.
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partial or conditional pardons.' Along with much of American law and society,
the pardon power underwent significant changes during the Civil War.'
3. Pardons from the Civil War Through Reconstruction
The Civil War years brought forth several scenarios involving presidential
pardons. Prior to Abraham Lincoln becoming the nation's sixteenth President, his
predecessor, James Buchanan, used the pardon power to release Mormon settlers in
Utah from treason charges." This act set a precedent for using the pardon power,
not as an act of mercy or to free supporters, but as a tool to reconcile national
divisions.' Similar techniques were used in the Civil War to develop loyalty and
heal a divided nation."
The secession of the Confederate States divided the newly formed nation, and
President Lincoln used the pardon power to develop loyalty to the Constitution.'
Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson - the only President prior to Bill Clinton to
be impeached' - followed suit and issued a number of pardons for the similar
82. See Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855); Kobil, supra note 16, at 594. On Apr. 23,
1852, William Vells was sentenced to hang for a murder committed in the District of Columbia.
President Fillmore granted Wells a conditional or partial pardon. The pardon order placed the condition
that
[f]or divers good and sufficient reasons I have granted, and do hereby grant unto him, the
said William Wells, a pardon of the offence of which he was convicted - upon condition
that he be imprisoned during his natural life; that is, the sentence of death is hereby
commuted to imprisonment for life in the penitentiary of Washington.
Id. at 308. The court ruled that the President's power, as adopted in the Constitution from similar powers
of the king, includes the right to lower a sentence as much as the right to offer a full pardon. Id. at 313-
15.
83. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 594-95. Professor Kobil describes the granting of Civil War
amnesties and the attempts by Congress to restrict the President's pardon authority. The conflict was
resolved by the Supreme Court, who ruled that the pardon power belongs solely to the President and is
not subject to legislative control. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
84. See Harold Schindler, Utah War Broke Mormon Hold on Territory Utah War Broke Mormon
Hold on State, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 21, 1996, at N2. The territory's forced removal of federally
appointed Judge W.W. Drummond and related uprising caused newly elected President James Buchanan
to order federal troops into Utah to remove Governor Brigham Young. Between 1857-58, Brigham
Young was removed as governor, federal troops would be sent into the territory to squeal uprising, the
Mountain Meadow massacre would scare the church, and on the 25th anniversary of the formation of
Mormon church in Utah, President Buchanan authorized pardons for those who were accused of treason
in the uprising. The pardons were conditioned on the requirement that those accepting the pardon deed
must pledge allegiance to the United States. See id.
85. See id
86. See Kobil. supra note 16. at 593-95 (describing-pardons of confederate soldiers with the purpose
of reuniting the nation).
87. See JONATHAN TRUMAN DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON (1953)
(overviewing historical pardons during the civil war); Kobil, supra note 16, at 593-95 (arguing the Civil
War pardons, that required a loyalty oath, were used as a method to heal the nation and develop loyalty);
KALLENBACH, supra note 73, at 543-44.
88. On March 2, 1867, overriding a presidential veto, Congress enacted the Tenure of Office Act,
which required the consent of the Senate before a President could remove from office a member of the
President's own cabinet. President Andrew Johnson had taken the Act as an affront to the constitutional
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purpose of excusing allegations of crimes in order for citizens to develop loyalty to
the federal system." In 1862, Congress passed a statute that allowed Lincoln to
issue war amnesties,'9 but later repealed that law when it felt Johnson was abusing
the privilege by iss;uing too many pardons." In a loyalty oath case, the Supreme
Court held that Congress may not meddle with the pardon power.' The Court
stated that the pow. r is "unlimited, with the exception stated," and "fi]t extends to
every offence knlown to the law . . . ."" Therefore, despite any opposition to a
presidential pardon, the power is absolute and at the complete discretion of the
President.' The only available remedy would be for the President to be impeached
if the power is abused.95
powers allotted to the executive branch, and on February 21, 1868, had removed a member of the
Cabinet with whom he had a significant conflict: the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. On February 24,
1868, the House of Representatives impeached Johnson. The Senate held a trial, presided by the Chief
Justice, Samuel Chase, where the President prevailed by one vote. As with the impeachment of President
Clinton, some charged that the motivation was not the enforcement of law, but politics. See May, supra
note 75, at 908-20.
89. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 593-95 (citing Presidential Proclamation (May 29, 1865), reprinted
in 6 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 310; Presidential Proclamation (Sept. 7, 1867),
reprinted in 6 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS. supra note 70, at 547; Presidential Proclamation (July 4,
1868), reprinted in 6 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70. at 655; Presidential Proclamation (Dec.
25, 1868), reprinted in 6 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 708).
90. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 593 (citing Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 13, 12 Stat. 589, 592).
Congress later repealed the act authorizing the amnesties in 1867. See Act of Jan. 21, 1867, ch. 8, 14
Stat. 377. The Supreme Court eventually resolved this conflict by stating that pardon powers are plenary
powers of the President that may not he regulated by Congress. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 381 (1866).
91. See David D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction,
1865-1873, 51 U. Cm. L. REv, 131, 139-47 (1984).
92. See Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380-81. Justice Fields, in his opinion in Garland, wrote that
a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the
offender, and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he never committed
the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities
consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disibilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were,
a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
Id. The opinion also set; forth the exclusive right of the President to issue pardons without regulation
by the legislature or overview by the courts. In regards to the pardon power of the President, the decision
stated that
[tlhe power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every
offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either
before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and
judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can
neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.
The benign prercgative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions.
Id. at 380.
93. ld.
94. See id. The orly exception to the absolute power is the textual prohibition preventing a
President from using a pardon to overtqmr an impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
95. See U.S. ConsT. art. 1I, § 4 ("The President .... shall be removed from Office on impeachment
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4. Pardons During the Twentieth Century
As the Twentieth Century experienced the expansion of the federal government
and the presidency, pardons were not exempt from this growth. While over 20,000
pardons have been granted during the Twentieth Century, most were not
significant. A few, however, were noteworthy. For example, President Richard
Nixon pardoned Jimmy Hoffa for jury tampering.' Not long thereafter, President
Gerald Ford issued the most famous pardon in United States history by granting a
full pardon to Nixon, who had resigned over the Watergate scandal. 8 Ford claimed
that he wanted to end America's nightmare with Watergate, and issuing a pardon for
Nixon would be the correct measure to close the era."9 The possibility of a long
trial caused Ford to state that "the tranquility to which this nation has been restored
by events of recent weeks could be irreparably lost by the prospects of bringing to
trial a former President of the United States.""lal
President Jimmy Carter closed some of the final doors of Watergate by
commuting the sentence of G. Gordon Liddy, a key "plumber" in the Watergate
scandal."0 ' More important, President Carter issued amnesty pardons to those who
violated the Selective Service Act during the Vietnam War.'" As President
Johnson did after the Civil War, President Carter was attempting to help heal a
shaken nation, which was still recovering from the divisiveness of the Vietnam ex-
perience.' 3 President Carter was not the first Twentieth Century President to grant
amnesty for those who violated the draft. President Harry Truman granted amnesty
for those who, if approved by a presidentially appointed board, violated the draft
during World War Hl."
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
96. See Berkman, supra note 9, at Al; Kerr, supra note 9, at 1.
97. See Berkman, supra note 9, at Al (reporting on former Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa's
commutation to time served by President Nixon in 1971). Nixon's comnutation of Hoffa for jury-
tampering was conditional on Hoffa's agreement to stay out of union politics, which Hoffa later attacked
unsuccessfully. See id.
98. See Presidential Proclamation 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974) (pardoning Nixon for all
Watergate and other related offenses, including use of government agencies to cover up illegal acts,
including burglaries, tax evasion, and use of government agencies for improper purposes).
99. See id
100. d
101. See Samuel Dash, Congress' Spotlight On The Oval Office: The Senate Watergate Hearings,
18 NOVA L. REV. 1719, 1723 (1994) (describing the "plumbers" as a group of individuals working for
Nixon that were involved in a number of covert projects to cover up Administration misdeeds); Berkman,
supra note 9, at AI (reporting on G. Gordon Liddy's sentence reduction to 52 months by President Carter
in 1977).
102. See Exec. Order No. 11,967, 42 Fed. Reg. 4393 (1977) (containing President Carter's
authorization order that allowed amnesties for violation of the Selective Service Act during the Vietnam
War).
103. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 1451, 1484-85 (1997) (stating post-Vietnam amnesty programs were
intended to "heal and restore social peace" to the nation).
104. See Exec. Order No. 9814, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,645 (1946) (containing President Truman's grants
of amnesty for selected individuals for violating the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act).
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
President Ronald Reagan, who never faced charges for his alleged involvement
in the Iran-Contra scandal, exercised his pardon power a few days before leaving
office on behalf of ten individuals, including New York Yankees owner George
Steinbrenner.Y President George Bush also used the pardon power in a
provocative case vhen he pardoned six alleged actors in the Iran-Contra scandal,
including former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger." By pardoning these
individuals, Bush also assured that he would not be called to testify in their
trials.'" The self-pardoning option crossed both the Nixon and Bush Ad-
ministrations, but neither issued such an order."°
III. History of Self-Pardon Consideration in the United States
While Presidents often use this exclusive power, only two chief executives have
contemplated issuing a self-pardon. President Nixon considered such a move when
he realized the devastating impact that the Watergate scandal would have on his
presidency. The Bush administration also reviewed the self-pardon option during
the Iran-Contra arms for hostages scandal."'
A. Richard Nixon and Watergate
When President Nixon came to the conclusion that surviving an impeachment
vote and subsequent Senate trial was hopeless, he was presented with a number of
options to facilitate the conclusion of his presidency."' In a later Congressional
hearing, President Ford discussed an August 1, 1974, meeting he had with Nixon's
White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig."' Haig laid out options developed
by Nixon's legal team, including Special Counsel James St. Clair, the alleged author
105. See Ninth-Inifng Pardon, TIME, Jan. 30, 1989, at 31 (reporting on President Reagan's
pardoning of Yankees owner George Steinbrenner for illegally funneling $100,000 to Richard Nixon's
1972 re-election campzign); Bill McAllister, Reagan's Finale: Quips, Appointment, Pardons, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 1989, atA7 (reporting on President Reagan's pardoning of Steinbrenner's fine of $15,000
forillegal campaign dorations to the 1972 Nixon presidential campaign). President Reagan also pardoned
nine other individuals for relatively minor crimes, including a North Dakota health official who received
a 10-day jail sentence for filing a false report with the government and a Mississippi man convicted of
possessing liquor in a unstamped container, which violated the tax code. Id.
106. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
107. See Bush As.railed Over Pardons Granted to 6, CH. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at 10.
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh stated that these pardons, including that of former Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, were done as "an act of friendship or an act of self-protection" for the
President. Id. Walsh also alleged that the political purpose of granting the pardons would in effect
prevent Bush from testifying as a witness in their trials. See id.
108. See infra notes 111-18 & 124-38 and accompanying text.
109. See infra noto 127 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 111-18 & 124-38 and accompanying text.
111. See Schorr, supra note 10, at 13A (describing President Ford's October, 1974, appearance
before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee reviewing Ford's pardon of President Nixon);
BoB WOODWARD & CtRL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 325-26 (1976) (overviewing the final days of
the Nixon administration when Nixon's lawyers informed the President that it would be legal to issue a
pardon for himself).
112. See Schor, slpra note 10, at 13A.
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6f a memorandum advocating the legality of a self-pardon.' In the private forty-
five minute meeting, from which all aides were excluded, Haig set forth five options
available to Nixon."" Along with "toughing it out" through impeachment, invoking
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to leave office temporarily,"' and
resigning with the expectation his successor would pardon him, Nixon also was
asked to consider pardoning himself and resigning or pardoning all Watergate
defendants and himself before resigning."6 Ford subsequently acknowledged
Nixon's consideration of the self-pardon option, and Nixon's belief, with the advice
of his legal team, that he could pardon himself."7 In considering his options,
Nixon reportedly vowed to "put the special prosecutor out of business by leaving
nothing unpardoned.."". In 1973, Solicitor General Robert Bork"' argued that a
President must have immunity from criminal acts while in office, due to the fact a
President could pardon himself for any acts committed while in office, thereby
preventing criminal prosecution during his term as President."l Nixon obviously
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXV (allowing a President to temporarily declare that he is "unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office," and subsequently regain his power upon declaration
to the Senate).
116. See Schorr, supra note 10, at 13A (indicating Nixon considered a self-pardon).
117. See Murray, supra note 2, at Al (quoting President Ford as saying that in considering a self-
pardon he believed it was legally based on what "the lawyers thought he had the power to do").
118. Id. (describing Nixon's consideration of self-pardoning by declaring that he would rule nobody
out of consideration to shut down the special prosecutor, Nixon, in the end, did not pardon himself).
119. Robert Bork served as United States Solicitor General during the Nixon Administration, when
the "Saturday Night Massacre" occurred. On Saturday, October 20, 1973, President Richard Nixon
ordered Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox to be fired. Attorney General Elliot Richardson
refused to carry out the President's order and resigned, and the number two official, William
Ruckelshaus, was removed for refusing to carry out Nixon's order. As the number three official at the
Justice Department, Bork assumed the role and fired Cox. Bork's record also includes serving as a law
professor at Yale, an attorney with the Washington law firm of Kirkland and Ellis, a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and a nominee, by President Reagan, to the Supreme
Court. Bork withdrew his name from consideration to the Court after a tremulous nomination hearing
in the Senate. See generally Samuel Dash, Independent Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal
Prosecutor, 86 GEO. LJ. 2077 (1998); Nadine Cohodas, For Robert Bork the Real Test Begins Now,
CONG. Q., Sept. 12, 1987, at 1; Frank Trippett, The Battle Begins: Bork's Nomination is Likely to Stir
a Fiercely Political Senate Fight, TIME, July 13, 1987, at 10.
120. See Memorandum of the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional
Immunity at 20, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled Dec. 5, 1972 (D. Md. 1973), cited in
Eric Freedman, The Law As King and The King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal
Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, 58 (1992) (noting Bork's pronoun-
cement of the President's ability to pardon oneself as a method of nullifying any conviction that took
place while serving in office, thus creating an immunity from criminal prosecution while in office).
While Bork acknowledges the President's ability to pardon himself, he also notes that "if Clinton pardons
himself, it would be such an abuse of power that it ought to become an impeachment matter." Matthew
Robinson, National Issue Clinton 11: Probed, Paralyzed?, INv. BUS. DAiLY, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al. Of
course, a President would likely sign his self-pardon order just prior to leaving office. See Gillers, supra
note 8, at 11A (arguing the timing of a presidential self-pardon would likely occur during the President's
lame-duck period after the election proceeding his retirement from office).
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chose to place his fate in the hands of his successor, Gerald Ford, who denies
having made a deal before the resignation.' Nevertheless, while a self-pardon
was not used, the President's advisors considered the idea."
B. George Bush tnd the Iran-Contra Affair
In November 1.986, the country learned of the Iran-Contra scandal, an illegal
scheme to secretly sell arms to Iran through Israel in hopes of freeing United States
hostages being held in Lebanon, and diverting funds from the sales for military
action in Nicaragua." Prior to leaving office, President George Bush issued
pardons that formed, in effect, a constructive self-pardon for his alleged conduct in
the Iran-Contra scandal.'" In the midst of the Iran-Contra crisis, Independent
Counsel Lawrence Walsh brought forth grand jury indictments against some of
President Bush's aides, who were alleged to have contributed to the breaking of laws
regarding the scandal." During the month prior to the beginning of the trials of
the indicted individuals, Bush granted pardons that effectively shut down inves-
tigations and trials regarding Iran-Contra." Walsh alleged that ihese six par-
dons, 7 including that of former Reagan Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger,
121. See Schorr, supra note 10, at 13A.
122. See id,
123. See REPORT OFTHE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITrEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN.CONTRA AFFAIR,
H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong. (1987). In 1984, the Reagan Administration, primarily
through the National Security Counsel, started secretly moving arms through Israel for secret sales with
Iran, in order to procure favor with the Iranians to place pressure on Lebanon to release a number of
United States citizens being held hostage in Lebanon. The monies raised from these sales were allocated
to anti-communism movements in Central America. This act violated the Boland Amendment, which
prohibited the U.S. from increasing spending for the Nicaraguan's Contra insurrection. See Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-618, § 801, 98 Stat. 3898, 3304 (1985). The law in effect
stopped previous support of the United States government's support of the Contras in Nicaragua, who
were attempting to ov,.rthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government. See id.
124. See Bush Assailed Over Pardons Granted to 6, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at 10; RW.
Apple, Jr., The President as Pardoner: A Calculated Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at A23
(remarking Bush's pardons of Iran-Contra would be recorded in history "as the President who in effect
pardoned himself'); see also Dash, supra note 119, at 2094 (stating "[i]ndeed, the presidential pardons
and successful campaign to discredit Walsh may have been the final acts of cover up of the Iran.Contra
affair"); Eric Brazil, Ex-Special Prosecutor Doubts Starr's Goals Probing Lewinsky Case Exceeds
Mandate, He Says, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 27, 1998, at A7 (citing a Iran-Contra special prosecutor, James
Brosnahan, as denouncing Bush's pardon of Caspar Weinberger as an act, in effect, of pardoning
himself).
125. See Dash, supra note 119, at 2094. Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh publicly
released his final indictment of Reagan Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on the Friday prior to the
1992 presidential election, which brought criticism that the indictment was issued to influence the
election. See Malcolm S. Forbes, Editorial, Dirty Trick (Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh Indicts
Caspar Weinberger for Statements on George Bush's Role in Iran.Contra Scandal Shortly Before the
Election), FORBES, Nov. 23, 1992, at 25.
126. See Apple, supra note 124, at A23. The trials were scheduled to begin January 5, 1993, just
12 days after the pardons were issued. See Larry Bensky, Burying Iran-Contra, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 17,
1993, at 7fZI; Harold Hongju Koh, Essay, Begging Bush's Pardon, 29 Hous. L. REv. 889 (1992)
(arguing Bush's pardons nullified the rule of law).
127. The six people who received pardons were former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger,
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were issued as "an act of friendship or an act of self-protection" for the
President." Of the six pardoned, three had already pled guilty, one was already
convicted, and two - including Weinberger - were set to be tried." Walsh also
alleged that the political purpose of granting the pardons would effectively prevent
Bush from being exposed as a witness in their trials." Bush, however, claimed
that he was merely using the pardon power to even out the fact that the opposition
was using the criminal system to combat policy differences.' Bush did, however,
acknowledge that the "Christmas Eve Pardons" were politically motivated.' In
fact, President Bush's pardon document states:
The prosecutions of the individuals I am pardoning represent what I
believe is a profoundly troubling development in the political and legal
climate of our country: the criminalization of policy differences. These
differences should be addressed in the political arena, without the
Damocles sword of criminality hanging over the heads of some of the
combatants. The proper target is the President, not his subordinates; the
proper forum is the voting booth, not the courtroom. 33
In addition to the political motivation, it could be argued that Bush was attempting
to bring closure to this issue in the national interest. One name that did not appear
on the list of the six pardoned was George Bush. President Bush was under
investigation for withholding key documents from investigators and other related
charges, as well as his direct role in the Iran-Contra scandal."3 President Bush
could have said, as he did with the pardon of Weinberger, that the intent for a self-
pardon would be understandable due to the "patriotic" motivation by which other
pardons were granted.' While Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh
Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, and three
former Central Intelligence Agency officials: Duane Clarridge, Alan Fiers, and Clair George. See
Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992); Presidential Present, TIME, Jan. 4, 1993, at 11
(reporting on the six lran-Contra pardoning and establishing their titles and roles in the government).
128. Bush Assailed Over Pardons Granted to 6, supra note 107; Walsh Soldiers On, TIME, Feb. 22,
1993, at 15 (quoting Walsh as saying that Bush's pardoning of six Iran-Contra was a "grave disservice"
to the country).
129. See James Gill, Walsh's Quarry, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 1, 1993, at B7.
130. See Bush Assailed Over Pardons Granted to 6, supra note 107; Jorgensen, supra note 31, at
360; William Schneider, Bush's Pardons Break All the Rules, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at M2 (citing
a CNN-USA Gallup poll concluding that fifty percent of the American public believed Bush's motive
in granting pardons was "to protect himself from legal difficulties or embarrassment resulting from his
own role in Iran-Contra").
131. See Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992) (containing Bush's Christmas Eve
Pardons of key Iran-Contra figures).
132. See id.
133. Id.; see also Stephen Carter, The Iran-Contra Mess, 29 Hous. L. REv. 883, 886 (1992)
(criticizing Bush for issuing pardons based on an "overzealous prosecutor," but acknowledging the
plenary pardon power in the system of checks and balances inherently required in the constitutional
structure).
134. See Schorr, supra note 10, at 13A.
135. See Proclamation No. 6518,57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992). (stating "Caspar Weinberger is a true
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has stated that he doubts whether a President could pardon himself, legal scholars
and presidential lawyers beg to differ, primarily because nothing in the Constitution
prevents the act of self-pardon.'" Some have suggested that Bush refrained from
pardoning himself not because of the question of the constitutionality of self-pardon,
but rather out of concern for his image and the historical record of not being seen
as a weak figure, 3 Bush could have pardoned himself and protected his record
by claiming that it was for the good of the nation and not a self-interested
motive." Bush, like Johnson and Carter, could have claimed that the pardon was
in the national interest of bringing closure to the subject and healing the nation on
this divided issue.'" In fact, Bush claimed that Weinberger's and the other five
pardons were granted due to the patriotism of those accused."
While the Bush camp pondered the question of self-pardons, other options were
available, including resigning on January 19, 1993, and swearing in Vice President
Dan Quayle, who could have been President for the administration's final day and
issued Bush a pardon. 4' Another option for Bush was to invoke the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, which would have given the powers of the presidency to the vice-
president for the time specified by the President, thus allowing Quayle to pardon
Bush, and for Bush to then immediately regain the powers of the presidency.'
Instead, Bush decided to take his chances of not being prosecuted.
IV. Constitutional Interpretations Regarding Self-Pardons
A. Textual Arguments
A textual interpretation of the Pardon Clause provides the strongest argument that
a self-pardon is not prohibited by the Constitution. The concept of a textual
interpretation is extremely lucid and direct, but its significance is essential. The
Supreme Court has stated that the pardon power is plenary, and when interpreting
it, one should look to the text to determine its authority."
American patriot" and "the common denominator of their motivation - whether their actions were right
or wrong - was patrotism").
136. See WOODWARD & BERNSTIN, supra note I11, at 325-26; Ferrara, -supra note 15, at A14;
Schorr, supra note 10, at 13A.
137. See Schorr, supra note 10, at 13A (regarding Bush's consideration of self-pardons) ("Bush
would probably see that as the coward's way out").
138. See Gill, supra note 129, at B7.
139. See id.
140. See Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992).
141. See Gill, su,7ra note 129, at B7.
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
143. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974). Chief Justice Burger wrote that "the plain purpose
of the broad power conferred by § 2, cl. 1, was to allow plenary authority in the President to 'forgive'
the convicted person in part or entirely, to reduce a penalty in terms of a specific number of years, or
to alter it with conditions which are themselves constitutionally unobjectionable." Id. at 266. Burger went
on to pronounce that "we therefore hold that the pardoning power is an enumerated power of the
Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself." Id. at 267.
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The text of the presidential pardon power reads: "Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment."'" The Constitution does not contain any other words regarding pardons,
and it does not contain any text specifically restricting the President's ability to self-
pardon.
As one commentator has stated, "[t]he Constitution provides no limitation on the
pardon power, and it has been consistently interpreted to be virtually unlimited."'
The only limitation is the restriction on impeachment,'" and if the Framers had
intended the text to restrict the pardon power even more, they most likely would
have made this intention apparent from the plain meaning of the Constitution. For
instance, to restrict self-pardoning, the Framers could have included a clause similar
to the following: Power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
United States, except in cases of impeachment and against oneself.
Other scholars have recognized the textual permissiveness of self-pardons.'47
Colonel Richard Rosen recently wrote that "nothing on the face of the Constitution
prohibits a President from pardoning himself. .. .,'" Professor Edward Foley has
argued that while a President cannot "undo" an impeachment, the Constitution
allows him to protect himself from further prosecution.'49 This textual argument
is essential and it stems from the words drafted by the Framers.
B. Original Intent Arguments
The pardon power was not widely discussed in the Constitutional Convention,
30
however, one may infer that no restriction on self-pardoning was intended by the
Framers. While the Framers were putting the constitutional framework in order,
they looked at restrictions on the governors in the various colonies, and no colony
expressly prohibited self-pardons.' Alexander Hamilton professed that the
144. U.S. CONsT. art. I1, § 2.
145. Ferrara, supra note 15, at A14 (advocating, as a former Associate Deputy Attorney General
of the United States, that a constitutional amendment is needed to prevent a President from exercising
the pardon power on himselt).
146. See U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2; Freedman, supra note 120, at 58 ("[A]ny President who pardoned
herself for a crime of that sort would likely forfeit political support and be impeached.").
147. See Col. Richard Rosen, Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth
of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL L. REv. 1, 148 n.703 (1998). Colonel Rosen's article only
briefly mentions the ability of self-pardoning when he states that "nothing on the face of the Constitution
prohibits a President from pardoning himself of herself in the event of such a prosecution, with exclusion
of impeachment proceeding." Id.
148. Id.
149. See Bush, supra note 15, at 3A.
150. See ROTUNDA, supra note 48, at 600 (stating common law firmly established the executive
pardon power that the Constitutional Convention's delegates adopted with little discussion).
151. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 587 (citing the government of Massachusetts restricting the
governor to pardons only after conviction); see also Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629). Fearful of a
monarchy, some states did not allow the governor to hold a sole pardon power. The governments of
Connecticut and Rhode Island placed the power in the legislature, but only with the governor and six
assistant governors being present. See Charter of Connecticut (1662); Charter of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations (1663). See generally Duker, supra note 37, at 500-01.
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President should have the same power as the King of England, whose power to
pardon was limited only in cases of impeachment."s In fact, while some Framers
wanted to place limitations on the pardon power, such as a Senate approval for
pardons, this restriction was flatly rejected in favor of an exclusive presidential
power with only one limitation."
One restriction discussed was whether the President should have the power to
pardon treason charges." An argument that is particularly relevant and supports
the theory that self-pardoning was not excluded from the Framers' intent is that of
Edmund Randolpb, who argued that pardoning for treason should not be allotted to
the President, since "[t]he President may himself be guilty [because] [t]he Traytors
may be his own instruments."" Randolph worried that the President may release
his accomplices, thereby indirectly allowing himself to be spared, save impeach-
ment." Others held the prevailing view, that anyone trusted with the presidency
is worthy of this supreme power.'" The Framers' final version did not prevent
pardons for treason or any other reason except those involving impeachment.' 5
Therefore, Randolph's view that self-dealing may be a problem was directly rejected
in favor of a stronger presidency with the risk of occasional abuse. The Framers
also structured'the Constitution in a particular manner, but the plain meaning of the
text indicates that self-pardoning is permitted.
C. Structural Argu'ments
While the text of the Constitution does not prohibit self-pardoning, some have
argued that the structure of the Constitution does.'" This section will set forth the
structural arguments asserted and the reasons why those arguments are not as
persuasive as the textual arguments supporting self-pardoning.
One argument ':s that the provisions in the Constitution which provide for a
President to be prosecuted following his term in office would be nullified by the use
of a self-pardon." According to this contention, the Constitution explicitly
152. See THE IErERAUST Nos. 69, 74 (Alexander Hamilton); Duker, supra note 37, at 500-01;
Kobil, supra note 16, tt 594-95.
153. See W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING OF THE PRESIDENT 14-17 (1941) (discussing the
Constitutional Convention, where James Madison argued for some Senate oversight of pardons, particular
in cases involving treason); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2 (listing only one restriction on the pardon
power, which prohibits overturning an impeachment).
154. See MADisoru, supra note 55, at 471-72.
155. Id.
156. See id
157. See Duker, supra note 37, at 509-21 (demonstrating historical arguments that the President is
vested with the awesome sole power of impeachment, because anyone worthy of this grand office is
trusted to administer it; duties appropriately).
158. See U.S. COI4ST. art. II, § 2.
159. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
160. See U.S. Co-qsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("[J]udgements in Case of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to remova" from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust
or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgement and Punishment, according to Law."); Clinton: Well, Paaardon Me?, supra
note 12, at 14.
[Vol. 52:197
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss2/3
PRESIDENTIAL SELF-PARDON POWER
provides that a former President is subject to normal criminal charges after leaving
office, and the power to pardon oneself would prevent such prosecution.' This
viewpoint, however, is inappropriate, due to the fact that a pardon removes the
particular criminal act from an individual's record, thereby eliminating any act that
may be prosecuted." Prosecution may still occur if a President does not pardon
himself." For example, Richard Nixon decided not to invoke the self-pardon, and
could still have been prosecuted.'"
Another structural argument centers on the idea that the Constitution is designed
to avoid self-dealing.'" This belief may be true, but even a presidential self-
pardon may not be solely an act of self-dealing. A President may use the pardon
power, not for himself, but rather to help heal a divided nation and bring closure to
an issue.M Richard Nixon could have thereby spared Gerald Ford the odious task
of issuing the pardon for his predecessor." While self-dealing may be a factor,
the country may actually be a significant beneficiary of the self-pardon concept.
President Clinton, for example, until the conclusion of his presidency, could use the
pardon power not only to heal the deeply divided country over his alleged misdeeds,
but also to close the investigation by the independent counsel and to disband any
grand jury." € Certainly, one could argue that the Clinton impeachment issue
divided the nation and that a more rapid conclusion of the ordeal undoubtedly would
have been positive for the nation as a whole.
The Constitution provides a set of checks and balances to assure compliance by
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The check on the transgressions of
the President is impeachment." The pardon power, however, cannot be reviewed
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
162. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (stating a pardon "releases the
punishment and blots out of existence guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the offence"); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160-61 (1833)
(holding a pardon "exempts" that person from "the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed").
163. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7.
164. See Schorr, supra note 10, at 13A; see also Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601
(1974) (containing Ford's pardon of Nixon).
165. See Presser, supra note 15, at 21 (arguing the structure of the Constitution has checks and
balances that prevent a self-pardon).
166. There is a long history of using the pardon power for national healing and closure. The pardon
power was first used as a tool for national healing in the United States by President Buchanan, when he,
pardoned Mormon settlers accused of treason in 1858. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
National healing was later used as a reason to pardon by President Andrew Johnson, who used the power
to heal the Civil War by granting pardons to confederate soldiers. President Carter followed suit by
granting relief to Vietnam War protestors who failed to serve in the required draft. See generally Kerr,
supra note 9, at 1; Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 103, at 1484-85.
167. See Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974).
168. See Harvey Silverglate, Editorial, Close the Starr Chamber - Clinton Slould Move Case Into
PoliticalArena, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 16, 1998, at 27 (arguing President Clinton can pardon all of the
actors surrounding the Independent Counsel investigation and even himself to end the process).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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by the legislature, as Congress has no power to regulate the pardon.'" The
Supreme Court wrs very clear when it stated in 1866 that "[t]his power of the
President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect
of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign
prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions.'. Therefore, the President may exercise the pardon power for anyone
- including himself - except in cases of impeachment.
D. Precedent Arguments
A self-pardon ease brought to the Supreme Court would be one of first
impression, yet the Court's reasoning in other pardon cases set forth precedent that
indicates that a self-pardon is not prohibited by the Constitution. The Court would
first have to decide whether to address the issue or simply refuse to make a
determination on the merits, based on the notion that this is a political question. In
the first substantial pardon case, United States v. Wilson, in 1833, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote, "[ilt is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the court."'" The Court went on to state that, while a court may
review a pardon, it review is limited, and a court will not judge the "character" of
the pardon deed.' The President may. argue that so long as the pardon was
executed and delivered correctly, it is valid as an executive action, and a court may
not judge its legitimacy beyond the formalities of the document. A self-pardon case,
however, unlike those involving the general pardon standard, would go directly to
the meaning of the Constitution, including separation of powers, and not merely a
political question.
In Ex parte Garland,4 the Supreme Court used extremely strong language to
say that the President's pardon power is "unlimited," except for the impeachment
exception. 7 In even more powerful language, the Court stated that "Congress can
neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of
offenders."'76 The Court reaffirmed this position five years later when it held that
Congress is restrained in controlling the pardon power.'" The President could
argue that the language "any class" would include himself.
The Supreme Court has also stated that the remedy for abuse of the pardon power
is found in impeachment, not the lessening of the power conferred to the
President. In Ex parte Grossman,"" Chief Justice Taft wrote that if the
170. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
171. Id.
172. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160-61 (1833).
173. See id. at 161.
174. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
175. See id. at 380.
176. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380 (emphasis added).
177. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141.42 (1871).
178. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
179. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
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President used his power to overturn contempt orders and lessen the powers of the
judiciary, that "would suggest a resort to impeachment rather than to a narrow and
strained construction of the general powers of the President."'" Again, the Court,
through the writings of former President Taft, noted that the only remedy for an
abuse of the pardon power is impeachment, not judicial intervention."'
More recently, in Schick v. Reed," the Court held that in reviewing the pardon
power, it should be read from "the language of that clause itself."'" The Court
went on to state that any limitations on the power are found in the Constitution
itself," and not some other source; thus, since the Constitution only has one
limitation, the President is eligible to pardon himself. One commentator has argued
that in Schick, the Court left open the possibility of some control, when it stated that
the President may "commute sentences on conditions which do not themselves
offend the Constitution."'" As stated above, the Court has defined the presidential
pardon power as unconditional, except for impeachment. Although a direct case has
never been brought, a strong precedential argument may conclude that there is no
prohibition on self-pardons.
V. Proposal
While a self-pardon may be constitutional,"8 and may even be permissible under
the situation presented to President Clinton, no individual should have the ability to
place themselves in judgment of their own actions in the public arena. This
quagmire in the Constitution ought to be resolved preventatively. To accomplish
this, an amendment to the Constitution would clarify the ambiguity in Article II.
The following constitutional amendment is proposed:
Section 1: The President of the United States Shall Have the Power
to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses, Except Impeachment,
Against the United States to All Individuals Except for the President's
Spouse, Children, Siblings, Parents, or Self
Section 2: Congress Shall Have No Power to Regulate This Authority.
Section 1 of this proposed amendment not only restricts the president's ability to
pardon him or herself, but also removes the power to pardon members of his direct
family. A system that allows a president to judge and pardon himself or members
180. Id. at 121.
181. See id.
182. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
183. Id. at 265.
184. See id. at 267 ("We therefore hold that the pardoning power is an enumerated power of the
Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself.").
185. See Kalt, supra note 15, at 803-04 (citing Schick, 419 U.S. at 263-64).
186. See John Leo, On Granting an Iranscam Pardon: A Debate Grows over the President's Power
vs. the Public Good, TIME, Apr. 11, 1988, at 57 (quoting law professor Michael Josephson, speaking of
Ronald Reagan and Iran-Contra, stating "Reagan, on the other hand, could pardon everyone, theoretically
including himseilf). Professor Josephson alludes that a system that allows a self-pardon cannot possibly
be "proper," but acknowledges the theoretical possibility in the Constitution. See id.
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of his direct family diminishes the confidence that is essential in a democracy and
tears at the very concepts of the rule of law.' Professor Peter Shane has
remarked that "[o]-ar founders believed that the new Constitution deserved the
allegiance of the citizenry in large part because of the ideas of governance that it
embodied."'" This proposed amendment, however, in no way contradicts the
conclusion that a presidential self-pardon is currently permissible by law. The
proposal merely suggests a solution to this ambiguity in the Pardon Clause, thereby
eradicating the loophole for which the Constitution currently allows.
Section 2 of this proposed amendment maintains the pardon power with the
presidency. It also assures that the Congress will not have the constitutional
authority to infringe on the power, a power the Founding Fathers granted
exclusively to the executive branch."
VI. Conclusion
The textual, historical, structural, and precedential arguments set forth in this
article indicate that the President of the United States has the power to issue
pardons to any individual, including himself, except to overturn an impeachment.
This power is plenary and may be exercised at anytime.'" The Supreme Court
stated in 1866 that "[tlhe power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception
stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any
time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their
pendency, or after conviction and judgement. '' 91
A self-pardon by President Clinton would have likely caused a political backlash
with many member; of Congress and with the public. One commentator stated that
"[f]or a President to pardon himself would, admittedly, be an act of unprecedented
chutzpah, but the Constitution does not forbid it, containing nothing that cir-
cumscribes the 'power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States.""' President Clinton, prior to attempting such a constitutional maneuver,
would be wise to consider its result in his already maligned historical legacy, in
addition to the fact that any criminal charges against him are widely believed to be
weak at best.
Just as important, President Clinton would have to consider the political, historical
and legal recoil that may occur after using a self-pardon, including possible calls to
remove the pardon power from the presidency. An amendment to the Constitution
could certainly remove the power, or at least greatly restrict the President from
187. For a discussion of the rule of law in the Constitution, see Peter Shane, Presidents, Pardons,
and Prosecutors: Legal .Accountability and the Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 361,
381-84 (1993). See also TRIBF, supra note 79, at 1673-87 (describing the process of law as a governing
mechanism).
188. Shane, supra note 187, at 405.
189. See Ex pare Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866).
190. See id. at 380-81.
191. Id. at 380.
192. Gill, supra nole 129, at B7.
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pardoning members of his staff, family, himself, or others. If correctly drafted, such
an amendment may even be applied retroactively to Clinton. After all, an
amendment may effectively alter any part of the Constitution.'93 The broad power
of the presidential pardon could even be removed as an exclusive power and be
given legislative control, as was present in two of the original colonies."l
As of today, there is no question that all of the actors surrounding
Whitewater 9s Travelgate,'" Filegate,' Electiongate,' the Paula Jones law-
suit,' the Monica Lewinsky affair,' or other scandals could be released from
193. See U.S. CONsT. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....").
194. See Kobil, supra note 16, at 589-90 (citing the governments of Connecticut and Rhode Island
as placing the power in the legislature, but only with the governor and six assistant governors being
present); see also Charter of Connecticut (1662); Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
(1663).
195. In 1978, then-Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton, his wife Hillary, and friends invested in a real estate
development known as Whitewater, where some allege wrongdoing in the structure and use of the land
deal, as well as the misuse of the governor's powers. See Bill Clinton's Luck, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1999,
at 27.
196. The 1993 Travelgate scandal occurred when White House officials fired seven longtime
members of the White House Travel Office, whose responsibilities included arranging travel for the
White House Press Corp. The new team was headed by a 25-year-old former campaign worker who was
a distant cousin of the President. See Charles Fenyvesi, Washington Whisper Whitewater: Is the Tide
Turning in the First Family's Favor?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 1994, at 21.
197. The Filegate scandal occurred when a White House security aid obtained over 400 sensitive
FBI personal security files on political enemies. Clinton claimed that the aid used an outdated list of
former White House employees from the previous Bush Administration and apologized for the mistake.
See David Bowermaster, Summer on the Grill; First It Was Whitewater, Then Travelgate and
Disappearing Records, Now It's the FBI Files, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, July 1, 1996, at 24; Carl
Mollins, And Now, "Filegate"; The Whiffs of Scandal Will Not Lift From Bill Clinton's Campaign,
MACLEAN'S, July 1, 1996, at 26.
198. President Clinton faced criticism for the methods of raising money for his 1996 re-election
campaign, including an accusation that some of the 938 people who stayed overnight in the famous
Lincoln Bedroom, located on the third floor of the White House, were invited based only on the amount
of contributions given to the campaign. Clinton responded by stating that the people staying in the
Lincoln Bedroom were "friends" and the "The Lincoln Bedroom was never sold." The Lincoln Bedroom
Scandal, MACLEAN'S, Mar. 10, 1997, at 29. Clinton was also accused of taking campaign contributions
from foreign sources, particularly members of the People's Republic of China. This fund raising allegedly
took place in part at "coffee" mixers, where potential donors were hosted for social gatherings in the
White House. See Nancy Gibbs, Cash-and-Carry Diplomacy: The Latest Documents Show a Close Link
Between the White House and Democratic Donors on Matters Best Left to the National Security Council,
TIME, Feb. 24, 1997, at 22; Mark Hosenball, On the Trail of a "China Connection". Why the Scandal
over Clinton's Foreign Money Keeps Raising Questions About Beijing, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1997, at
30; Daniel Klaidman, Fumbles In High Places, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1997, at 26.
199. In May 1994, Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee during the period when Bill
Clinton was Governor, filed a law suit against Clinton alleging he sexually harassed her in the Little
Rock Excelsior Hotel. See Michael Isikoff, " Want Him To Admit What He Did," NEWSWEEK, June 9,
1997, at 30. While the lawsuit settled, Clinton was impeached for allegedly providing false testimony
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further prosecution with the pardon order.' There is also no doubt that the list
of those pardoned may include the President's wife, his confidantes, and even his
political foes, including Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. If the President were
to pardon himself, such an action would undoubtedly be seen as an act of great
audacity; however, in this era of rabid partisanship, such a brazen act may be
considered appropriate. Certainly, some people would be sympathetic to such an act,
especially in light of the fact that other public figures have recently been accused
of similar indiscretions, including the Speaker-elect of the 106th House of
Representatives and members of the House Judiciary Committee."' President
before a federal grand jury concerning his relationship with White House Intern Monica Lewinsky, who
he was asked about in a discovery deposition. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see alvo infra
note 200 and accompanying text.
200. President Clinton was impeached, but acquitted, for matters surrounding his affair with a 22-
year-old White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. Clinton was accused of lying and attempting to cover-up
the relationship in the Paula Jones lawsuit. See supra notes 2, 199 and accompanying text; see also
Michael Isikoff, Clinton and the Intern, NawswEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 30; Lee Walczak, It This One
Scandal Too Many, BUsINEss WEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 38. Clinton was, however, held in civil contempt
of court for giving "intentionally false" statements about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky at a
January 17, 1998 deposition. See Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, 1999 WL 202909, at *8 (E.D. Ark.
Apr. 12, 1999); see also Roberto Sur, Judge Finds Clinton in Contempt of Court, WASH. POST, Apr,
13, 1999, at Al.
201. See U.S. CONSr. art. 11, § 2; Ferrara, supra note 15, at A14 ("Under the Constitution he can
pardon everyone who ha; evidence against him, his wife, or his friends, in return for their silence.").
Furthermore, the Constitution only limits a pardon against impeachment, but not any specific offense or
person. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
202. Several members of Congress who voted on the impeachment of President Clinton similarly
admitted to marital indiscretions, including:
Bob Livingston (R.-La), House Speaker-Elect of the 106th Congress, who resigned during the Clinton
Impeachment hearing after his own affair was revealed. See Nancy Roman, Impeachment Debate
Resumes, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1998, at Al; William Welch, Livingston: "My Fate Is In Your Han&s":
Republicans Maintain Support for Incoming House Speaker, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 1998, at 22A
(quoting Livingston as saying, "[D]uring my 33-year marriage to my wife, Bonnie, I have on occasion
strayed from my marriage"). Livingston removed his name from the final House Speaker vote and
announced his resignation from Congress due to this revelation. See Jill Lawrence, Poisonouv
Atmosphere Pervades Washington Politics, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 1998, at 10A.
Bob Barr (R.-Ga.). In a reported ease, outspoken Judiciary Committee member Robert Barr - from
Georgia's most conservative district - was photographed during his third marriage licking whipped
cream off of a woman's breasts at a charity luncheon. See Lloyd Grove, Clinton's Public Enemy; Even
Before Monica Lewisky, Bob Barr, Had Impeachment on His Mind, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1998, at E01
("Barr enlivened a Leukemia Society luncheon by - as one local newspaper put it - 'licking whipped
cream from the chests of two buxom women.'); Andrew Phillips, Daring to Speak The Capitol's "I-
word," MACLEAN'S, Mar. 30, 1998, at 34 (stating about Representative Barr, "but his critics quickly
pointed out that the champion of family values has been divorced twice, has been sued for child support,
and was once photographed licking whipped cream off a woman's breasts - to raise money for charity").
Helen Chenoweth (R-fdaho). See John Farmer, A Glass House Got Its Due for Throwing Stories,
STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 13, 1999, at 001; Ellen Goodman, Editorial, How Much Do We Need To Know About
Sex Lives?, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 15, 1998, at 7B (demonstrating Representative Chenoweth
admission of a six-year affair with a married man).
Dan Burton (R-Ind.). See Lawmaker's Statement Includes Apology, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 5, 1998,
at A09 (reprinting a state-nent from Representative Burton, who stated about his affair, while married,
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Clinton may believe that his actions, although wrong, were reviewed by a partisan
independent counsel with an agenda influenced by zealots in the 105th session of
the House of Representatives - including House Judiciary Committee Chairman
and Impeachment Manager Henry Hyde, who also has admitted his own marital
indiscretion.'e This hypocrisy may disenfranchise many Americans from politics
and dissuade others from entering public service. ' It is this same attitude that
may warrant the President's consideration of a self-pardon in order to place a check
on a partisan Congress.
In the final analysis, our constitutional system depends on the trust of the
American people and that trust is best secured by a system that does not allow a
leader to stand in judgment of him or herself. A constitutional amendment of the
presidential pardoning power is therefore needed to afford the American people a
more secure democracy.
that, "[tlhere have been some rough times during my 38 years of marriage. In fact, we were separated
several times and at one point almost divorced. I have certainly made some mistakes that are mine and
mine alone. There was a relationship many years ago from which a child was bom. I am the father.").
203. See Tody Eckert, Hyde Admits to Affair 30 Years Ago: He Sees "Attempt to Intimidate Me,"
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 17, 1998, at A14 (describing Hyde's affair); Howard Kurtz, Report of
Hyde Affair Stirs Anger, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1998, at AIS (quoting Hyde as stating, in describing his
five-year affair to a married woman, while married, beginning at age 41, that "the statute of limitations
has long passed on my youthful indiscretions").
204. See Roger Simon, Perspective, Seeking Ofice? Better Be Squeaky Clean, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20,
1998, at I (describing the results of the press "outing" candidates and members of elected office for
having affairs).
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